Basic Aspects of the Agreements between Israel and the PLO (Article II
7 This agreement intends to extend arrangements made for Palestinian selfgovernment in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area throughout the West Bank. The Interim Agreement is a complicated document of more than 300 pages and includes seven annexes. It lays down detailed provisions on the election of the Palestinian Council and provides for the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Council as well as for extensive arrangements on security issues, including the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank, which issue is partly also addressed in the nine maps attached to the agreement. Furthermore, the relations between Israel and the Palestinian Council are addressed with regard to legal and economic matters. It also sets out a framework for enhancing cooperation between the two parties and deals with the release of Palestinian prisoners and detainees.
Peter Malanczuk
It is important to note that arrangements made by the Interim Agreement incorporate or supersede all of the provisions made in the three earlier agreements. 8 The new arrangements remain in force throughout the five year transitional period which started from the date on which the Gaza-Jericho Agreement had entered into force (4 May 1994) and thus shall be completed by 4 May 1999. Negotiations on permanent status issues are to commence not later than the third year of the interim period.
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The Interim Agreement specifies this date as 4 May 1996.
10 Issues to be addressed in the permanent status negotiations include 'Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours and other issues of common interest'.
11 The permanent status arrangements arising from the negotiations are to be implemented at the end of the five year transitional period. 24 This argument is not convincing for die following reasons. If die Israel-PLO agreements are not international agreements under public international law, then they must be governed by some national legal system, as in the case of so-called 'state contracts' concluded by a host state and a foreign company (unless, as more frequently in the past, a reference in the contract is made to international law as the governing law, which does not necessarily elevate the contract to the level of a treaty in the international law sense).
III. The Legal Nature of the Agreements Between Israel and the PLO
25 Quite apparently, this would lead to absurd results. 26 First, the view held by some authors that the vagueness of treaty provisions may lead to the conclusion that these provisions are not legally binding is in itself incorrect. If the parties intended to conclude a treaty, then it is binding as a whole, even if some parts contain broad or unclear language. Vague provisions may give the parties a broad margin of discretion, but, as Bernhardt notes, that is not to say that they are without legal significance and binding substance. 27 Secondly, even if one would like to take the contrary view, the There are other arguments supporting the view that the agreements between the PLO and Israel are legally binding ones. First, if they were supposed to be nonbinding it would not have been necessary to include dispute settlement provisions which also provide for the option of arbitration which is a form of legally binding third-party settlement. 30 Secondly, it has also been argued by the parties themselves (at least by the Israeli side) that the disrespect of fundamental provisions of the agreement by one party may result in the right of the other party to terminate it.
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This only makes sense if the agreement is considered a legally binding treaty, because if it is a non-binding agreement there is logically no need to terminate it; there are no obligations in the legal sense anyway. Finally, also in view of the nature of the issues to be settled between the parties, it is hardly conceivable that either of the parties would like to understand the commitments made as merely non-binding ones from which one side could withdraw at will.
The parties to the Israel-PLO agreements have laid down very specific obligations for the transitional period and concluded a pactum de negotiando regarding the permanent status with very clear time-limits. The agreements in their entirety are 'hard law' and not any kind of so-called 'soft law' 32 , even with regard to the agreement to negotiate on the permanent status. Although an agreement to negotiate does not necessarily imply an obligation to reach an agreement, it implies that serious efforts towards that end must be made 33 . The parties are legally obliged to make use of all available means of negotiation in good faith with a view of achieving a definite substantive agreement and they must continue or even renew these negotiations as long as one side insists on further discussion and the other side cannot rely on a valid ground recognized in the law on treaties for terminating a treaty or withdrawing from its operation. 34 
IV. The Legal Effects of the Agreements on the Basic Relationship Between the Parties
The basic relationship between Israel and the PLO has been fundamentally altered by steps of legal recognition, barring them in the future from treating each other only as de facto entities. 35 The process of legal recognition commenced with the letter from the PLO chairman Arafat of 9 September 1993 stating that 'the PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.' The PLO further renounced the use of terrorism and other acts of violence. It also affirmed that 'those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist... are now inappropriate and no longer valid' and undertook to initiate the required changes in the Covenant. In his reply letter of 9 September 1993, Israel's Prime Minister confirmed, in view of the commitments made by the PLO that 'the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people...'.
There has been some discussion in the literature on the legal nature of these letters, especially on whether they constitute unilateral promises which, as such, are legally binding. 36 In the present author's view, it would be more accurate to regard the exchange of these letters as constituting a binding international agreement in itself because the obligations undertaken are not unilateral in nature but based upon reciprocity leading to the agreement, as expressed in both letters, to commence negotiations on a peace settlement. 37 However, the issue has lost its practical significance since the undertakings expressed in the letters of 9 September 1993 have been incorporated by reference in the 1994 Cairo Agreement which is clearly a bilateral agreement.
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In renouncing terrorism and the use of force (between which a definite line is not always easily drawn) the PLO has rendereed moot the controversial issue of the extent to which international law and the principle of self-determination permits the As correctly noted by the Israeli side, interim arrangements are interim arrangements only:
Basic Aspects of the Agreements between
[T]hey are not in any way intended to influence the outcome of the permanent status negotiations. In other words, in the upcoming permanent status negotiations, no party may be barred from raising a claim or argument regarding the permanent status merely because that party has agreed in the Interim Agreement that a different arrangement may be implemented during the interim period.
V. The Legal Effects of the Agreements on the Status of the West Bank and Gaza
The legal status of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 is controversial 47 . The basic positions of the parties with regard to the areas currently designated for Palestinian autonomy under the arrangements can be briefly summarized as follows. Israel does not consider the West Bank and Gaza part of its sovereign territory and has made no attempts of de iure annexation as in the cases of East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights (which the international community has not recognized because annexation is no longer accepted in international law as a valid method to acquire territory). Israel views them as 'territories under the control of an Israeli military government', although it also emphasizes that it 'has a claim to sovereignty over these areas.'
48 Furthermore, Israel still officially holds the view that the West Bank and Gaza are not de iure 'occupied territory' in the sense of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (the humanitarian provisions of which it has agreed to observe only on a de facto basis) with the 58 But this conclusion neglects the fact that this arrangement is not based on a unilateral Israeli act but on an agreement between the parties. Furthermore, as has been noted above, it is also clear from a legal point of view that this is only an interim arrangement without Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.
Does the law on military occupation cease to apply after the withdrawal of Israeli forces on the basis of the agreements with the PLO? Benvenisti has the following view:
After relinquishing its control, as envisioned in the Declaration, at least in Gaza and Jericho, Israel will have no effective control, and thus no right to reoccupy those areas. As provided for in the Declaration, the Palestinian entity in Gaza and Jericho has a life of its own, and does not draw its authority from the Israeli occupation or from the Declaration, but from the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. Therefore, the Declaration establishes an irreversible step towards the settlement of the conflict.
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There are two main points to be made in this connection. First, it is doubtful whether the DOP constitutes an 'irreversible step' because it is conceivable that there may be problems on the way to peace which may cause Israel to reoccupy the areas from which it has withdrawn. Whether such action is legally justified or not, in that case the law of war would again be applicable. This is the essence of distinguishing between the ius ad bello and the ius in bello in international law. Second, it is doubtful whether the laws of war, inter alia, protecting the civilian population fully cease to apply simply because of the Israeli withdrawal. Israel has retained jurisdiction over Israelis and the Israeli settlements in the respective areas, controls security and external relations and has retained the 'residual power'. In effect, Israel is therefore still an occupant with regard to the fields which it has not transferred to the Palestinians for self-government. A different conclusion would lead to the absurd result of legalizing the current status quo, including the Israeli settlements, from the viewpoint of international law.
One could further argue that the international law of occupation seems to set certain limits to Israel's scope of discretion to relieve itself of its responsibilities to protect the interests of the occupied territories by concluding an agreement to trans- Protected persons who are in occupied territories shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as a result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.
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However, this provision does not really fit to the current situation in the West Bank and Gaza as regards the agreements concluded with the PLO and the establishment of Palestinian institutions. As the occupying power, Israel is not unilaterally creating new institutions, such as the Palestinian Council, and the agreements concluded with the PLO are not agreements with existing local authorities in the occupied territories. The agreements are made with an entity recognised as representing the people in the occupied territories as a whole and, on the basis of the claim to selfdetermination, is demanding a much more intensive transfer of responsibilities that the current transitional arrangements provide for and which are a necessary precondition for a possible full termination of the status of the West Bank and Gaza as occupied territories in the future. Article 47 is not applicable to this unique kind of situation because there is no autonomy, possibly as a pre-stage to independence, without the delegation of authority and responsibility. The purpose of Article 47 is to ensure the protection of the inhabitants of territory remaining under military occupation; the purpose of the agreements with the PLO is to arrive at a lasting and definite peace settlement One cannot have one's cake and eat it too. What is required, therefore, is a differentiated application of the laws of war to the occupied territories in the light of the agreements themselves.
VI. The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Another important aspect of the Israeli-PLO accords is the question of which kind of dispute settlement mechanisms have been agreed upon by the parties. As a starting point, it is important to remember that in the decentralized international legal system there is no compulsory binding decision by a third party in disputes without the agreement in one form or another of the parties to the dispute. 
